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RECALLING THE LAWYERS: THE NHTSA, GM, 
AND THE CHEVROLET COBALT 
Bernard W. Bell* 
INTRODUCTION 
The legal community has debated lawyers’ roles and responsibilities in 
the criminal and civil litigation context, but devoted considerably less 
attention to such issues in administrative practice.  Agency adjudication 
often resembles civil litigation, suggesting a similar role for lawyers in 
those agency processes.  But many lawyers advise corporations on 
regulatory compliance issues. 
Financial scandals have ignited a vibrant debate over lawyers’ role as 
gatekeepers securing regulatory compliance.  The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has long emphasized transactional attorneys’ critical 
compliance role.1  Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(“Sarbanes-Oxley”) addressed the SEC’s authority over lawyers.2  One 
sponsor observed that when “executives and/or accountants are breaking the 
law, you can be sure that” their counsel “are not doing their jobs”;3 “[o]ne 
of the most critical responsibilities that those lawyers have is, when they see 
something occurring or about to occur that violates the law, . . . they must 
act as an advocate for the shareholders, for the company itself, for the 
investors.”4 
Section 307 directed the SEC to issue rules “for the protection of 
investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for 
attorneys appearing and practicing before the [SEC] in any way in the 
representation of issuers.”5  The rules were to require attorneys to “report 
up” securities infractions or breaches of fiduciary duty to the company’s 
 
*  Professor of Law and Herbert Hannoch Scholar, Rutgers Law School (Newark Campus).  
I am grateful to Donna Dennis, Douglas S. Eakeley, John Leubsdorf, and Laurel S. Terry for 
their comments on earlier drafts of this Article.  This Article is part of a larger colloquium 
entitled Lawyering in the Regulatory State held at Fordham University School of Law.  For 
an overview of the colloquium, see Nancy J. Moore, Foreword:  Lawyering in the 
Regulatory State, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2016). 
 
 1. See Emanuel Fields, Securities Act Release No. 5404, 45 SEC Docket 262, 266 n.20 
(June 18, 1973); accord SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541–42 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 2. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2012). 
 3. 148 CONG. REC. S6551 (July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards). 
 4. Id. at S6552. 
 5. 15 U.S.C. § 7245. 
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General Counsel or Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and, if necessary, its 
audit committee or board of directors.6 
The SEC promulgated rules giving content to section 307’s “reporting 
up” requirement7 (“Sarbox rules”), asserting jurisdiction over a sizable 
swath of legal practice through its broad definition of the phrase “appearing 
and practicing” before the SEC.8  It also proposed a “reporting out” 
requirement, namely the “noisy withdrawal” rule.9  If responsible corporate 
officers failed to take reasonable remedial steps, the lawyer had to (a) 
withdraw from the representation, indicating that the withdrawal was due to 
“professional considerations,” and (b) advise the SEC of any materially 
false or misleading statement in any SEC filing the attorney had assisted in 
preparing.10  After receiving unfavorable comments,11 the SEC revised its 
proposal to provide that upon an attorney’s withdrawal for “professional 
considerations,” the company would have to report the withdrawal.12 
Imposing compliance obligations on securities lawyers is somewhat 
consistent with ensuring proper representation of their “clients.”  The client, 
the corporate entity, includes several groups of “constituents,” one of which 
is the shareholders.13  Obligations to ensure that companies do not make 
material misstatements in SEC submissions do not necessarily conflict with 
counsel’s obligations to the corporation in general, or the shareholders in 
particular.  Indeed, section 307 counteracts the pressure on corporate 
counsel to pursue management’s interests at other constituencies’ 
expense.14  However, Sarbox rules provide protections to at least one 
group—investors—not conventionally recognized as constituents of the 
corporate client. 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1–.7 (2016); see Implementation of Standards of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205 
(2014)). 
 8. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a); see Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6297–98. 
 9. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. 
71,670, 71,688–91 (Dec. 2, 2002) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2014)); see Roger C. 
Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 
725, 810–14 (2004). 
 10. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at 
71688–91. 
 11. Implementation of Professional Standards for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6324–25 
(noting that many commenters argued that the rule exceeded the SEC’s authority, conflicted 
with long-standing state ethics rules, and would cause clients to keep information from their 
lawyers). 
 12. Id. at 6324, 6326 & n.40 (discussing proposed section 205.3(e)). 
 13. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).  Indeed, a 
“corporation” is merely a proxy for its constituent groups’ collective interests. William H. 
Simon, Whom (Or What) Does the Organization’s Lawyer Represent?:  An Anatomy of 
Intraclient Conflict, 91 CAL. L. REV. 57, 89 (2003). 
 14. Am. Bar Ass’n, Report of the New York City Bar Association Task Force on the 
Lawyer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 62 BUS. LAW. 427, 434 (2007). 
2016] RECALLING THE LAWYERS 1901 
But discussions of lawyers’ gatekeeping roles have rarely expanded 
beyond the securities context.15  The last fifteen years have produced 
scandals involving manufacturers’ failure to recall defective motor vehicles 
or equipment, such as the Ford/Firestone rollover problems, the Toyota 
unintended acceleration problem, the Cobalt ignition switch defect, and the 
Takata airbag defect.16  Product safety provides a context outside of 
securities law in which to consider lawyers’ regulatory compliance 
responsibilities.  Because consumers are not “constituents” of the lawyer’s 
organizational client,17 the congruence between the lawyer’s organizational 
client and regulatory beneficiaries in the securities area does not exist in the 
field of product safety.  Nevertheless, the physical harms that may befall 
consumers are far more serious than the financial losses shareholders 
typically suffer. 
This Article summarizes product safety and vehicle safety law and 
recounts General Motors Company’s (GM) response to the Cobalt ignition 
switch defect, paying particular attention to the actions of GM’s in-house 
and outside counsel.  This Article then considers the legality and prudence 
of a regulatory agency’s imposition of gatekeeping responsibilities on such 
counsel. 
I.  PRODUCT AND MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY 
Product safety lies at the intersection of civil justice and regulation.  
Products liability law provides a damages remedy to those injured by 
defective products.18  Such cases are generally brought against a 
corporation, almost invariably the product manufacturer, and ordinarily do 
not turn on identifying the individuals responsible for the defect.19  Critics 
have asserted that products liability law imposes excessive and crippling 
liability on manufacturers.20 
Products liability litigation is retrospective, seeking to allocate losses 
attributable to defective products rather than to remedy defects before they 
cause injury.21  And, like all civil litigation, it is lawyer focused.  Lawyers 
possess the primary responsibility for conducting the litigation;22  the 
 
 15. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing Clients:  Can Lawyer Gatekeeper Rules 
Work?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 455 (2006). 
 16. See 2 RICHARD M. GOODMAN ET AL., AUTOMOBILE DESIGN LIABILITY §§ 6:102, 
6:104, 6:106.50 (3d ed. 2015). 
 17. But see Simon, supra note 13, at 101 (including customers among corporate 
constituencies). 
 18. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 1.1, at 3 (2005). 
 19. “Fault,” particularly of specific individuals, is generally irrelevant in strict products 
liability cases. See, e.g., id. § 5.9, at 319. 
 20. See, e.g., Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 
104th Cong. §§ 2(a)(4)–(7) (2d Sess. 1996) (enacted and vetoed); OWEN, supra note 18, 
§ 1.3, at 24–25. 
 21. OWEN, supra note 18, § 10.8, at 726–27. 
 22. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. (the litigator controls the means of 
litigation and “need not pursue objectives or employ means simply because a client may 
wish that the lawyer do so”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3) (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2013); Zacharias, supra note 15, at 455–56. 
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lawyer is the intermediary through which the client acts.  Lawyers’ conduct 
in civil litigation is generally the business of state bar disciplinary 
authorities or, in the case of federal suits, the federal courts. 
Several federal agencies also have jurisdiction over product safety, most 
notably the Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC), the National 
Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA), and the Food 
and Drug Administration23 (FDA).  Regulated entities have reporting 
requirements designed to enable agencies to detect product defects.  The 
administrative process provides for product recalls and mandated product 
warnings designed to remedy defects or at least warn users of dangers.  
Several agencies can order recalls themselves or encourage and monitor 
manufacturers’ voluntary recalls.24  Most recalls are voluntary to some 
degree with the regulated entity initiating the recall, albeit sometimes at the 
regulatory agency’s suggestion.25 
With respect to the reporting and recall requirements, lawyers generally 
do not operate as litigators, particularly when the regulated entity decides 
not to raise an issue with regulators.  The NHTSA, the CPSC, and the FDA 
generally regulate corporations engaged in a particular field, but not 
lawyers’ professional conduct in providing regulatory advice. 
The National Highway Transportation Safety Act (“the Highway Safety 
Act”) grants the NHTSA authority to specify safety standards for motor 
vehicles as well as order recalls.  While the NHTSA has promulgated a 
number of safety standards, the agency primarily relies on the recall process 
to address vehicle safety issues.26  Manufacturers initiate most vehicle 
recalls.27  The Highway Safety Act and its implementing regulations require 
motor vehicle manufacturers to notify the NHTSA within five working days 
of discovering a safety “defect” in its vehicles,28 i.e., a defect that creates an 
“unreasonable risk of accidents or injuries,” and recall the vehicles to 
remedy the defect.29 
The manufacturer must remedy the defect without charge by either 
repairing or replacing the vehicle, or refunding the purchase price (less 
depreciation).30  Thus, if a manufacturer orders a recall without 
understanding the defect or the means of repair, it incurs an obligation to 
replace the vehicle or refund the purchase price.31  This might well entail 
extraordinary expense, making recalling a motor vehicle before determining 
 
 23. OWEN, supra note 18, § 1.1, at 2–3. 
 24. See, e.g., id. § 10.8, at 760 n.35; Andrew S. Krulwich, Recalls:  Legal and 
Corporate Responses to FDA, CPSC, NHTSA, and Product Liability Considerations, 39 
BUS. LAW. 757 (1984). 
 25. 2 GOODMAN, supra note 16, § 6:3; Anita Bernstein, Voluntary Recalls, 2013 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 359, 388. 
 26. JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 10–19 
(1990); 1 GOODMAN, supra note 16, § 3:3. 
 27. See Bernstein, supra note 25, at 388. 
 28. 49 U.S.C. § 30118(c)(1) (2012); 49 C.F.R. § 573.6(a)–(b) (2012). 
 29. 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(8). 
 30. 49 U.S.C. § 30120(a)(1)(A); Snyder Comput. Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 13 
F. Supp. 3d 848, 859, 865 (S.D. Ohio 2014). 
 31. Snyder Comput. Sys., 13 F. Supp. 3d at 865. 
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a defect’s root cause more undesirable than recalling inexpensive products 
in similar circumstances.32  Indeed, product defects can create a tension 
between a motor vehicle manufacturer’s engineers and lawyers:  engineers 
may wish to either await further testing that will yield a definitive 
explanation of the defect or characterize the defect as nonsafety related, 
while the lawyers may be inclined to push for a recall to limit potential civil 
liability.33 
A general information reporting system requires manufacturers to report 
information to the NHTSA.  Unlike in the securities context, where 
typically lawyers prepare disclosure statements necessary for access to the 
securities markets, no all-encompassing disclosure statements need be filed 
before putting a motor vehicle on the market.34  Information reporting is 
comprehensive and systematic and appears to entail reporting entities 
exercising only somewhat modest discretion.  Such reporting involves 
producing original documents rather than drafting statements about the 
product. 
Congress considerably enhanced the requirements for manufacturer 
reporting after the Ford/Firestone scandal.  While some of the 
enhancements targeted failures to include data on vehicle or tire failures 
abroad, the reporting requirements were enhanced even for vehicles in use 
domestically.  Under the Transportation Recall Enhancement, 
Accountability, and Documentation Act35 (“TREAD Act”) and its 
implementing regulations,36 manufacturers must provide a wealth of 
information, including notice bulletins, consumer advisories, 
communications regarding consumer satisfaction campaigns, technical 
services bulletins, and any other safety-related documents provided to 
dealers.37  Manufacturers must also provide information regarding deaths 
and injuries, property damage claims, consumer complaints, warranty 
claims, and field reports.  Unlike in civil litigation, and unlike preparation 
of SEC filings, lawyers do not appear to play a central role in the provision 
of TREAD Act data or in recall decisions.38 
 
 32. See 2 GOODMAN, supra note 16, § 6:109; Krulwich, supra note 24, at 763. 
 33. Krulwich, supra note 24, at 763–64. 
 34. Manufacturers must certify to distributors and dealers that the vehicle complies with 
all federal motor vehicle standards. 49 U.S.C. § 30115 (2012); see MICHAEL J. KEATING & 
THOMAS H. CASE, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE SERIES:  DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY COMPLIANCE PROGRAM § 1:30 (2015). 
 35. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30170.  The Act was adopted to address two deficiencies with 
regard to the Ford/Firestone deaths:  first, NHTSA’s lack of critical data, and second, its 
inability to employ available data to spot product defects. H.R. REP. NO. 106-954, at 7 
(2000). 
 36. Reporting of Information and Documents About Potential Defects; Defect and 
Noncompliance Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 18136 (Apr. 15, 2003). 
 37. 49 U.S.C. § 30166(m)(3)(c); 49 C.F.R. § 579.5 (2014); see ANTON R. VALUKAS, 
REPORT TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY REGARDING IGNITION 
SWITCH RECALLS 32 (2014). 
 38. For example, at GM the TREAD Act responses were signed by Gay Kent, Director 
of Product Investigations during much of the period relevant to the Cobalt defect. See, e.g., 
Letter from Gay P. Kent, Dir. of Prod. Investigations, Gen. Motors Corp., to Christina 
Morgan, Chief, Early Warning Division, Office of Defects Investigation Enforcement, 
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II.  THE COBALT IGNITION SWITCH AND GM’S RESPONSE 
On February 7, 2014, GM recalled approximately 780,000 Chevrolet 
Cobalts and Saturn Ions due to a defective ignition switch.  Drivers could 
inadvertently turn the car’s ignition from “run” to “accessory,” killing the 
engine and deactivating the car’s airbags.  The announcement capped an 
eleven-year odyssey in which GM engineers failed to identify and remedy 
the defect.  Approximately 124 deaths and 274 injuries have been attributed 
to the defect.39 
GM’s in-house lawyers have been harshly criticized for their role in 
GM’s deficient response from several quarters,40 including Anton Valukas, 
who investigated GM’s actions on behalf of GM’s Board of Directors.  At 
least five in-house lawyers were ultimately asked to leave the company, 
including William Kemp, GM’s chief in-house regulatory compliance 
lawyer.41  GM’s outside counsels for products litigation have received little, 
if any, criticism. 
GM’s legal department contained separate groups responsible for 
products liability litigation and safety compliance.42  Products liability 
claims were handled by in-house products liability attorneys until litigation 
commenced, at which point GM retained outside counsel.43  GM required 
outside counsel to provide a preliminary report on potential liability and 
subsequent updates.44  GM’s in-house lawyers held “roundtable” 
discussions at which settlements up to $2 million could be approved.45  
Claims between $2 million and $5 million could be approved by the 
Settlement Review Committee46 (SRC).  Only settlements greater than $5 
million required General Counsel approval.47 
In an August 3, 2004, memo, GM’s then-General Counsel advised the 
legal staff to elevate certain issues to superiors.48  In deciding upon the 
 
NHTSA (Apr. 6, 2006) (on file with author).  No in-house counsel served on GM’s three-
person committee that decided on recalls. 
 39. GM IGNITION COMPENSATION CLAIMS RESOLUTION FACILITY, DETAILED OVERALL 
PROGRAM STATISTICS—REVISED (2015), http://www.gmignitioncompensation.com/ 
docs/Program_Statistics_8162015.pdf [https://perma.cc/84ZL-HQTY]. 
 40. The critics include members of Congress. See, e.g., Examining Accountability and 
Corporate Culture in Wake of the GM Recalls:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer 
Prot., Prod. Safety, & Ins. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 113th Cong. 22–
23 (2014) (statement of Sen. Blumenthal); Rena Steinzor, (Still) “Unsafe at Any Speed”:  
Why Not Jail For Auto Executives?, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 443, 460–61 (2015); Peter J. 
Henning, How G.M.’s Lawyers Failed in Their Duties, N.Y. TIMES:  DEALB%K (June 9, 
2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/how-g-m-s-lawyers-failed-in-their-duties/ 
?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/X8G8-96CG]. 
 41. Bill Vlasic, In Surprise, Top Lawyer at G.M. Sets Retirement, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/18/business/michael-millikin-gms-top-lawyer-is-
retiring.html [https://perma.cc/ZHS5-WDHJ]. 
 42. VALUKAS, supra note 37, at 104–05. 
 43. Id. at 105. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 107. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 109–10. 
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appropriate response to a regulatory violation, the attorney was to consider 
the violation’s seriousness, the danger to others, and his own degree of 
knowledge, level of experience, and position at GM.49  Attorneys were 
advised to report to the General Counsel if their superiors were not 
appropriately addressing the issue.50 
GM began developing a new ignition switch in the late 1990’s.51  GM 
had specifications for the torque needed to turn the key in the ignition.52  If 
the key turned too easily, drivers could inadvertently turn the car’s ignition 
from “run” to “accessory,” causing a loss of power, i.e., a “moving stall.”53  
Even more seriously, accidentally turning off the car would disable the car’s 
airbags.  Though the new switch failed GM’s specifications, engineer 
Raymond DeGiorgio approved it nevertheless.54  The switch was used 
starting with 2003 Ions and 2005 Cobalts.  DeGiorgio approved a switch 
modification that increased the torque needed to turn the key in 2006.55  
The modified switch was installed in some 2007 Cobalts and all later model 
Cobalts.56  However, DeGiorgio neither created a unique part number for 
the modified switch nor advised others of the change.57  As a result, 
investigators dismissed the ignition switch as the source of seemingly 
anomalous air bag nondeployments because later model year Cobalts did 
not suffer such nondeployments. 
GM’s response to the ignition switch defect can be divided into phases.  
In the first, GM became aware that Cobalts were subject to moving stalls 
due to inadvertent pressure on the ignition key.  However, GM officials did 
not consider the problem safety related.58 
The moving stall problem was the subject of a 2004 report, which 
identified the low-torque ignition switch as the source of the problem.59  
GM’s Current Production Improvement Team (CPIT), primarily consisting 
of business people and engineers, assessed the urgency of the problem.  
Instead of designating the switch a Level 1 problem, i.e., a safety problem, 
the CPIT classified it as a Level 3 problem, a “moderate” issue that requires 
attention on the next dealership visit or entails moderate cost, inter alia.60  
Such matters are considered less urgent, and cost is a factor in crafting an 
appropriate response.61 
In February 2005, GM issued a preliminary information alert advising its 
dealers of the issue.  The alert urged dealers to notify customers of the 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 25, 34. 
 52. Id. at 35–40. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 39. 
 55. Id. at 98. 
 56. See id. at 99, 102. 
 57. Id. at 100–02. But see id. at 102 n.417. 
 58. See id. at 33, 53–54. 
 59. See id. at 62–63. 
 60. Id. at 63–64; see id. at 41–42. 
 61. Id. at 64; see id. at 69–71. 
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potential for moving stalls and advise them to “remove unessential items 
from their key chain[s].”62  The CPIT ultimately concluded that there was 
no “acceptable business case” for fixing the ignition switch problem.63 
GM’s Product Investigations Unit, the engineers responsible for safety 
issues, decided against recalling the ignition switch in late 2005, opting for 
issuance of a Technical Service Bulletin (TSB), which offered customers 
plug inserts to ameliorate the ignition switch problem.64  However, the TSB 
was drafted to avoid using the word “stall,” a “hot” word GM avoids using 
in TSBs, as such “hot” words may create customer concern and draw the 
NHTSA’s attention.65  Though GM produced over 10,000 plug inserts, only 
430 customers requested them; Valukas noted the minimal likelihood that a 
customer would become aware of the need for and availability of the plug.66 
While “moving stalls” would seem to qualify as a safety defect,67 the 
industry appears to have disagreed.68  Indeed, in 2007, the NHTSA set forth 
a multifactor approach for determining whether stalling constituted a safety 
issue.69  Nevertheless, the conclusion that “moving stalls” are unrelated to 
safety seems contrary to the standards reflected in the admittedly sparse 
case law and prior recall practice.70 
The GM legal department’s receipt of reports regarding airbag 
nondeployment, beginning in late 2005, began a second phase of the Cobalt 
story.71  At the time, neither the engineers nor the lawyers understood the 
connection between the ignition switch and the airbag failures.  However, a 
Wisconsin state trooper and a team of Indiana University researchers made 
the connection.72  In a February 2007 report regarding a fatal Cobalt 
 
 62. Id. at 92. 
 63. Id. at 69. 
 64. See id. at 88. 
 65. Id. at 92–93.  The initial draft of the bulletin included the word “stall,” but Product 
Investigations excised the word.  A later decision to refer to the engine’s deactivation as a 
“stall” was inexplicably never implemented. See id. at 120. 
 66. Id. at 93–94.  Even when Cobalts were brought to dealers in response to a different 
recall, dealers did not install the “plug inserts.” Id. at 139.  Ironically, at least one of the 
Cobalts involved in a fatal airbag nondeployment had been brought to a dealer in response to 
a power steering recall. Id. at 149–50. 
 67. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INADEQUATE DATA AND ANALYSIS UNDERMINE 
NHTSA’S EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY AND INVESTIGATE VEHICLE SAFETY CONCERNS 12 (2015); 
VALUKAS, supra note 37, at 88; Christopher Jensen, Salamis, Key Rings and GM’s Ongoing 
Sense of Humor, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 26, 2005, at F1. 
 68. Valukas cited only Salsitz v. Nasser, 208 F.R.D. 589 (E.D. Mich. 2002). VALUKAS, 
supra note 37, at 72 n.280. 
 69. Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition, 72 Fed. Reg. 73,973 (Dec. 28, 2007).  The 
factors included:  the frequency of stalling, the speeds at which it occurs, the type of 
operation that produces it (e.g., starting, accelerating), the ease of restarting the vehicle, the 
stall’s effects on steering functions, and any resulting crashes. Id. 
 70. See Kevin M. McDonald, Judicial Review of NHTSA-Ordered Recalls, 47 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1301, 1336 (2001); Letter from Clarence M. Ditlow, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Auto Safety, to 
the Hon. Calvin L. Scovel III, Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Transp., at 7–8 (June 9, 2014), 
http://www.autosafety.org/sites/default/files/imce_staff_uploads/Scovell%20Letter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NM3Q-P4WA]. 
 71. See VALUKAS, supra note 37, at 103. 
 72. Id. at 115–17, 121–24. 
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accident, the state trooper, relying on reports accessible on the NHTSA’s 
website regarding Cobalt moving stalls and GM’s TSB, attributed the 
airbag’s nondeployment to the ignition switch problem.73  GM included the 
report in its quarterly TREAD Act submission.74  An April 2007 Indiana 
University Transportation Research Center report on the same accident also 
attributed the airbag’s failure to the defective ignition switch.75  The 
NHTSA-commissioned report appeared on the agency’s website. 
The NHTSA was aware of both the ignition switch and airbag 
deployment problems but, like GM, considered them unrelated. The 
ignition switch never gave rise to an investigation.76  The NHTSA took the 
airbag failures more seriously.  In November 2007, the NHTSA’s Defect 
Investigation Panel considered opening an investigation of Cobalt/Ion 
airbag nondeployments.  However, the panel ultimately decided against 
doing so, under the misconception that the airbag failures could be 
explained by the drivers’ failure to wear seatbelts and the vehicles’ 
departure from the roadway during the accidents.77  In April 2009 and 
February 2010, the NHTSA’s Office of Defect Investigations (ODI) looked 
into Cobalt crashes, but failed to investigate fully the airbag 
nondeployments.78 
Meanwhile, Cobalt crashes began coming up at GM legal department 
roundtables.  In September 2006, the roundtable approved a settlement in a 
case involving an inexplicable airbag nondeployment.79  Roundtables 
approved two more airbag nondeployment settlements in 2008.  The 
failures in each case were attributed to an unknown “sensing system 
anomaly.”80 
In October 2010, GM’s legal department received its first warning from 
outside counsel regarding potential punitive damages liability.  King & 
Spalding warned that a significant plaintiff’s verdict was likely “under these 
unusual circumstances in which an apparent malfunction (sensing system 
anomaly) prevented airbag deployment.”81  Moreover, the law firm 
continued, the circumstances surrounding the Cobalt sensing system 
anomaly “could prove fertile ground” for a punitive damages award.82  In 
January 2011, in-house products liability attorney Jaclyn Palmer presented 
a proposed settlement to the SRC, which approved it.  Palmer’s superior 
and Lucy Clark Dougherty, General Counsel for GM North America, 
indicated that several of the lawyers wanted to meet to discuss the sensing 
anomaly.83  However, the meeting did not occur until July.84 
 
 73. Id. at 116–17. 
 74. Id. at 117–18. 
 75. Id. at 121–23. 
 76. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 67, at 25. 
 77. Id. at 24–25. 
 78. Id. at 25. 
 79. See VALUKAS, supra note 37, at 112–13. 
 80. Id. at 141. 
 81. Id. at 142. 
 82. Id. at 141–42. 
 83. Id. at 146–47. 
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At the July meeting, the legal department told the Product Investigations 
Unit that Cobalt nondeployment cases represented a safety concern and that 
discovery of the malfunction’s “root cause” was urgent.85  Douglas 
Wachtel, Senior Manager of Product Investigations, expressed reluctance to 
take on the issue, but appeared to relent.86  Wachtel assigned engineer Brian 
Stouffer to investigate.  Such investigations were expected to be completed 
within forty days, but investigators suffered no adverse consequences for 
missing that deadline.87  Moreover, the engineer was expected to determine 
the “root cause” of the problem before making recommendations.88 
After a March 2012 follow-up meeting initiated by Palmer, Kemp 
promised to seek out an “executive champion” to oversee the investigative 
process.89  But in April 2012, before Kemp had secured a “champion,” 
another outside counsel, Eckert & Seamans, noted the likelihood of legal 
liability and the risk of a punitive damages award for yet another Cobalt 
crash.90  In May 2012, a member of GM’s Executive Field Action Decision 
Committee (EFADC), the committee that authorizes recalls, agreed to serve 
as the champion for the Cobalt investigation.  In mid-May, Kemp organized 
a meeting of high-level managers and directors to discuss the Cobalt 
problem.91 
GM’s legal department apparently first became aware of the Indiana 
study in June 2012, when an expert report by Erin Shipp, a plaintiff’s 
expert, referenced it.92  Shipp’s report attributed the anomalous airbag 
failures to the ignition switch defect.  Stouffer and other engineers 
dismissed Shipp’s theory because it failed to explain the problem’s 
disappearance in later model Cobalts.93  At a July 25 roundtable, Palmer 
explained Shipp’s theory and reported outside counsel’s view that GM 
would lose the case.  A junior and recently hired in-house counsel, Nabeel 
Peracha, asked why the Cobalt had not yet been recalled.  The other 
roundtable participants explained that GM’s engineers were “acutely 
aware” of the problem but could not fix it.94  According to Valukas, 
 
 84. Id. at 147–48. 
 85. Id. at 150.  A month before the meeting would take place, King & Spalding warned 
of GM’s potential liability in yet another case. See id. at 149. 
 86. Valukas reported that Wachtel did not recall attending the meeting. Id. at 152 n.684, 
153. 
 87. Id. at 289–90. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 164–65. 
 90. Id. at 167–69. 
 91. Id. at 171–72. 
 92. Id. at 180–82.  Prosecutors and GM would later agree that GM’s reporting obligation 
arose during this time period at the latest. Statement of Facts ¶ 115, United States v. 
$900,000,000 in U.S. Currency, No. 15 Civ. 07342 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015), ECF No. 1 
(Exhibit C to General Motors Deferred Prosecution Agreement, attached as Exhibit A to 
Complaint).  Perhaps, given the high burden of proof in establishing criminal liability, 
prosecutors were particularly generous in arriving at that date. 
 93. VALUKAS, supra note 37, at 185. 
 94. Id. at 184. 
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Peracha “got the sense from the other lawyers that they had done everything 
[they] could do.”95 
Stouffer continued working on the Cobalt issue.  Among other things, he 
asked DeGiorgio again if the ignition switch had been changed, and 
DeGiorgio reiterated that it had not.  Product Investigations engaged the 
Red X team, GM’s master problem solvers.  At the same time a group of 
engineers discussed options, including increasing the torque on the ignition 
switch and redesigning the sensors so that airbags would deploy even when 
the car was in accessory mode.96 
Meanwhile, yet another Cobalt nondeployment involving an August 12, 
2012, crash was the subject of a case evaluation by Eckert & Seamans.  In 
an October 31 memo, the firm noted that the case involved an airbag 
nondeployment typical of those “GM ha[d] seen [] in a few other 
matters.”97  The legal department approved a settlement at its December 12 
roundtable.98 
Product Investigations continued to investigate and hold brainstorming 
sessions regarding possible solutions.99  Ultimately, in February 2013, 
Stouffer pronounced the investigation “stuck”100 and asked that Subbaiah 
Malladi, GM’s top engineering consultant, be consulted.101 
But matters took a turn during an April 29, 2013, deposition,102 initiating 
a third phase of the Cobalt story.  Plaintiff’s counsel confronted DeGiorgio 
with photographic evidence of the Cobalt ignition switch’s modification.  
GM’s in-house lawyer, Ronald Porter, drove to the deposition site to 
retrieve the photographic evidence.  Three days later, King & Spalding’s 
Philip Holladay, who had defended DeGiorgio’s deposition, recommended 
to Porter and Kemp that GM hire Malladi, because the airbag 
nondeployment investigation needed to reach “closure without delay.”103 
On July 30, 2013, Malladi briefed Porter, Kemp, and outside counsel on 
his findings, namely that the switches installed in the 2005 to 2007 Cobalts 
did not meet GM’s torque specifications.104  Porter presented the case that 
led to GM’s discovery of the ignition switch change to the SRC in August 
2013.  The SRC authorized a $5 million settlement.105 
In November 2013, Stouffer concluded, anticlimactically, that the 
ignition switch had caused the airbag nondeployments.  Shortly thereafter, 
GM began its formal multistage internal process for commencing a 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 186–90. 
 97. Id. at 190. 
 98. Id. at 190–91. 
 99. Id. at 193, 195. 
 100. Id. at 196. 
 101. Id.  Kemp encountered resistance in obtaining approval from GM’s Chief Engineer 
due to cost concerns; Kemp sought to have Malladi appointed by GM’s outside counsel 
instead. Id. at 197. 
 102. Id. at 199. 
 103. Id. at 200. 
 104. Id. at 205. 
 105. Id. at 206–07. 
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recall.106  Ordinarily, a Product Investigations engineer presents his 
findings informally to the Product Investigations Director, the Director of 
Field Performance Evaluation (FPE), and in-house counsel, inter alia.107  
Thereafter, the FPE team meets to recommend a recall or some alternative 
action.  Next, the Field Performance Evaluation Recommendation 
Committee (FPERC) reviews the investigation and makes a 
recommendation to the EFADC.  A recall requires a unanimous vote of the 
three-person EFADC.108 
The Cobalt recall did not follow this process; perhaps the idiosyncratic 
nature of the process represented a failed attempt at expedition.  The FPE 
Director contemplated putting the matter on the EFADC’s November 18 
agenda, but was persuaded to move the item to the December 3 agenda, 
given the matter’s “complexity.”109  On December 2, 2013, two days before 
he was to retire, Stouffer made a presentation regarding the ignition switch 
defect to an informal group of FPERC members.110  They referred the issue 
directly to the EFADC, because of the legal department’s desire to proceed 
quickly.111 
However, the matter was pushed back to the EFADC’s December 17 
agenda.112  John Murawa, Stouffer’s replacement, presented the case for 
recall.  One EFADC member questioned whether the engineers had found 
the “root cause” of the airbag nondeployment.113  After the meeting, in a 
conversation with one of the EFADC members, the FPE Director expressed 
concern about the “execution details” of the recall, arguing that “the 
absolute last thing we need to do from a customer perspective is to rush a 
decision, post it on the NHTSA website that we have a safety decision but 
we cannot fix the customer vehicles for some period of time.”114 
At this point, one EFADC member briefly advised CEO Mary Barra of 
the potential recall; she advised him to “get the right data; then do the right 
thing.”115  Almost simultaneously, GM’s General Counsel was first advised 
of the Cobalt switch issue by Lucy Clark Dougherty.116  On January 31, 
2014, after Murawa’s supplemental presentation, the EFADC authorized a 
recall.117  On February 7, 2014, GM informed the NHTSA of a safety recall 
of 780,000 vehicles at an estimated cost of over $32 million.118 
On February 26, 2014, the NHTSA opened a civil enforcement 
investigation regarding GM’s delay in disclosing the ignition switch 
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defect.119  On May 16, 2014, the NHTSA and GM entered into a consent 
decree resolving those proceedings.120  GM admitted its violation of the 
Highway Safety Act’s five-day reporting requirement and agreed to pay $35 
million in penalties.121 
Federal prosecutors entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with 
GM on September 16, 2015.122  The prosecutors did not identify any 
TREAD Act reporting violations, but did allege, and GM admitted, that GM 
had “overshot” the Highway Safety Act five-day reporting requirement by 
twenty months.123  In addition, prosecutors and the company agreed that in 
light of GM’s response to the Cobalt defects, GM’s representations to the 
NHTSA during meetings on October 22, 2012, and November 7, 2013, 
were false and thus violated 18 U.S.C. § 1001.124 
The course of events described above, in light of other motor vehicle 
defect scandals, suggest that motor vehicle manufacturers often do not act 
aggressively with respect to safety defects despite what appear to be 
considerable incentives to do so.  Strict products liability would appear to 
give motor vehicle manufacturers strong incentives to find and remedy 
safety defects in their products.  Indeed, given the potential liabilities, in-
house and outside counsel might appear to be particularly strong advocates 
for addressing automotive defects. 
Strict products liability is designed to maximize the incentives for 
manufacturers to reduce product dangers.  With respect to GM’s lawyers, 
those incentives proved insufficient, but not entirely ineffectual.  Despite 
GM’s significant exposure to compensatory, and indeed punitive, damages 
(not to mention civil penalties under the Highway Safety Act), GM delayed 
for years in advising consumers of the danger or correcting the defect in its 
Cobalts, and its lawyers did not treat the issue with sufficient urgency.  
However, products liability law did result in at least GM’s lawyers—
outside counsel and in-house products liability attorneys—prodding 
engineers to identify and correct the problem and pressing for a recall.  And 
even William Kemp, GM’s chief regulatory compliance lawyer, made 
substantial efforts to move the investigation into the airbag nondeployments 
forward. 
III.  REGULATING ATTORNEYS TO ADDRESS 
MOTOR VEHICLE DEFECT SCANDALS 
The Cobalt tragedy has spawned several reform proposals.  Some see 
enhancement of the NHTSA’s monitoring capabilities or augmentation of 
 
 119. Consent Decree ¶ 9, TQ14-001, NHTSA Recall No. 14V-047 (May 16, 2014). 
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 123. Id. ¶ 115. 
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NHTSA’s ODI Director regarding GM’s delayed response to safety defects. Id. ¶¶ 95, 97. 
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penalties for noncompliance as the most efficacious response.125  Others see 
precluding secret settlements of products liability cases as a means of 
enhancing vehicle safety.126  Some reform efforts seek to encourage 
“whistleblowing,” offering a bounty to encourage employees to report 
defects to the NHTSA.127  Despite the criticisms of GM’s in-house counsel, 
no major proposal focuses on motor vehicle manufacturers’ in-house 
counsel. 
Lawyers’ provision of advice and laxity in monitoring compliance is 
particularly likely to facilitate corporations’ regulatory violations.  The 
NHTSA might consider enhancing the recall process, which largely 
depends on automobile manufacturers’ compliance efforts, by promulgating 
standards for lawyers counseling engineers and business executives 
regarding potential safety defects.  This part discusses the merits of such an 
approach.  First, the question of an agency’s authority to reach lawyer 
conduct must be tackled.  Thereafter, the question of whether an agency 
should add regulation of attorneys to its regulatory repertoire can be 
addressed. 
A.  Can the NHTSA Regulate Lawyers? 
In general, Congress has not explicitly granted federal agencies authority 
to regulate lawyers.128  In his seminal study, Michael P. Cox observed that 
“[e]xcept for the few agencies with express authority to promulgate rules 
and discipline attorneys for violation,” the authority to do so must be 
implied.129  Indeed, the Agency Practice Act allows individuals to select 
any member of a state bar in good standing to represent them in agency 
proceedings.130  Nevertheless, the Agency Practice Act’s text and the 
legislative history suggest that Congress did not intend to preclude agencies 
from disciplining lawyers for conduct that threatened the “order . . . and 
integrity of agency proceedings.”131 
 
 125. The Department of Transportation has sought dramatic increases to the civil 
penalties for failure to report defects and the NHTSA’s budget. See, e.g., Grow America Act, 
H.R. 2410, 114th Cong. §§ 4101, 4110 (2015). 
 126. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2014, S. 2364, 113th Cong. (2014); see Request for 
Public Comments on NHTSA Enforcement Guidance Bulletin 2015-01, 80 Fed. Reg. 57,046 
(Sept. 21, 2015); Press Release, Sen. Richard Blumenthal, For Bad Actors Seeking to Seal 




 127. Motor Vehicle Safety Whistleblower Act, S. 304, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 128. Typically, lawyers’ professional conduct is regulated by state bar authorities. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1, reporter’s notes.  Congress 
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 129. Michael P. Cox, Regulation of Attorneys Practicing Before Federal Agencies, 34 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 173, 198 (1984). 
 130. 5 U.S.C. § 500(b) (2012). 
 131. See Cox, supra note 129, at 198–200, 204 & n.139, 214 n.178; see 5 U.S.C. 
§ 500(b).  Section (d)(2), which provides that the Agency Practice Act does not “authorize or 
limit the discipline, including disbarment, of individuals who appear in a representative 
capacity before an agency,” was understood to permit a continuation of many agencies’ 
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1.  Gonzalez v. Oregon and Loving v. IRS 
Two major cases, Gonzalez v. Oregon132 and Loving v. IRS,133 suggest 
that an assertion of jurisdiction over lawyers’ conduct when participating in 
product recall decision making might be subject to a successful challenge.  
Gonzalez involved the Attorney General’s assertion of authority over the 
practice of medicine.  The Supreme Court acknowledged the federal 
government’s constitutional authority to regulate medical practice, despite 
the traditional state control over the subject.134  However, the Court 
rebuffed the Attorney General’s argument that the Controlled Substances 
Act allowed him to preclude doctors from prescribing drugs to terminal 
patients to end their lives.  Given the traditional state regulatory powers 
over medical practice, the Court was unwilling to assume such an 
expansion of federal authority over medical practice without a clear 
expression of intent.135  As a matter of “commonsense,” the Court noted, 
“the background principles of our federal system . . . belie the notion that 
Congress would use such an obscure grant of authority to regulate areas 
traditionally supervised by the States’ police power.”136 
In Loving, the D.C. Circuit considered whether the IRS’s express 
statutory authority to “regulate the practice of representatives of persons 
before the Department of the Treasury”137 allowed the IRS to regulate paid 
tax preparers.  Despite the agency’s invocation of Chevron deference,138 the 
court concluded that the statute did not authorize the IRS to regulate tax 
preparers.139  The court gave six reasons for its conclusion, but only two are 
critical for our discussion.140  First, tax preparers could not be considered 
“representatives” of taxpayers, because tax preparers have no power to bind 
their clients.  The court distinguished assisting a taxpayer from representing 
a taxpayer.  Second, to “practice” before an agency involves work only in 
connection with an “investigation, adversarial hearing, or other adjudicative 
proceeding.”141  The court considered preparing tax returns fundamentally 
 
exercise of disciplinary authority of lawyers who appeared before them. See, e.g., Letter 
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distinguishable from preparing for an agency adjudication and acting as an 
advocate during that proceeding.142  It noted that the act of filing a tax 
return does not initiate any adversary proceeding.  If the IRS disagrees with 
the tax return, the tax preparer is not invited to present arguments or engage 
in advocacy; instead, the IRS conducts its own ex parte, nonadversarial 
assessment of the taxpayer’s liability.  Only when a “return is selected for 
an audit, or the taxpayer appeals the IRS’s proposed liability adjustments, 
does a taxpayer designate a representative.”143  The tax preparer may be 
“practicing” in assisting with preparation of the tax return, but that does not 
constitute practice before the IRS.144 
2.  The NHTSA’s Context 
Like other agencies, the NHTSA has inherent power to regulate lawyers 
who practice before it.  But what does that mean in an area, like motor 
vehicle safety, that lies at the intersection of civil justice and regulation? 
Three groups of lawyers played a role in GM’s Cobalt response (and 
would probably play a role in any manufacturer’s response to vehicle 
defects):  outside products liability counsel, in-house products liability 
counsel, and in-house compliance counsel.  Of the three, the first seems 
furthest afield from the core of the agency’s inherent authority to regulate 
those who practice before it.  Outside products liability counsel 
unquestionably practice before the state and federal courts in which they 
litigate product defect cases.  They are subject to the obligations imposed 
by those tribunals and subject to control by state disciplinary authorities.  It 
is difficult to construe defending a products liability case as “practic[ing]” 
before the NHTSA.145  Indeed, such an approach would extend beyond the 
capacious approach the SEC has adopted in its Sarbanes-Oxley 
regulations—those regulations expressly exempt advocacy and 
investigative counsel from the duty to report up “evidence of a material 
violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty” by the company or 
its agents.146  And the role of the courts raises either separation of powers 
 
 142. Id. (“The Federal tax system is basically one of self-assessment, whereby each 
taxpayer computes the tax due and then files the appropriate form of return along with the 
requisite payment.”). 
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or federalism issues.  To the extent that the NHTSA’s exercise of authority 
would interfere with defending a products liability action, it might interfere 
with the operation of the federal courts, creating a separation of powers 
concern.147  The federalism concerns resemble those raised in Gonzalez, as 
control over lawyer conduct traditionally lies within the purview of state 
licensing and disciplinary authorities. 
Similar arguments can be advanced with regard to in-house products 
liability counsel.  Though they may not make appearances in court, such 
attorneys primarily provide support and guidance for civil litigation and 
address claims in anticipation of civil litigation.  At least GM in-house 
products liability lawyers do not appear to make NHTSA filings.148 
Arguably, under Loving, even compliance lawyers do not “practice” 
before the NHTSA.  In at least one critical respect, in-house compliance 
counsel’s role resembles that of tax preparers’.  Like the tax system, the 
product-recall system is based largely on self-reporting.  The Loving court 
relied heavily on the self-reporting nature of the tax system in finding that 
tax preparers did not “practice” before the IRS.  In effect, like the tax 
preparer, compliance lawyers for motor vehicle manufacturers assist in a 
self-reporting process that essentially precedes any form of agency process.  
The decision to initiate a recall is often an initiative of the regulated entity, 
not the result of interactions with the NHTSA.  The Cobalt recall ultimately 
involved GM’s own identification of the defect and provision of notice and 
a remedy to the public. 
However, the Loving court’s approach is arguably too artificial in the 
motor vehicle safety context.  The NHTSA’s ODI did contemplate opening 
an investigation into the airbag nondeployment issue; indeed, its failure to 
do so can be attributed to negligence.149  ODI and GM were also engaged in 
discussions regarding the safety implications of “moving stalls.”  Moreover, 
GM’s 2005 TSB was crafted to avoid the NHTSA scrutiny.  Thus, the line 
between self-reporting and “agency proceedings” is problematic.  While the 
NHTSA’s mandatory recall authority has fallen into disuse, voluntary 
recalls are merely an alternative to the NHTSA recall proceedings.150 
The application of another Loving factor is somewhat ambiguous in the 
motor vehicle context.  Loving emphasized tax preparers’ lack of authority 
to bind taxpayers, concluding that tax preparers do not “represent” the 
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taxpayer.  In-house compliance counsel presumably can make binding 
representations on behalf of the company.  However, unlike in the typical 
adversarial proceeding, other GM officials communicating directly with 
NHTSA officials can also bind the company.151  The lawyers appear to lack 
the sort of control in asserting the client’s position that lawyers traditionally 
hold in the prototypical adversarial proceeding at the core of the typical 
federal agency’s authority to regulate practice before it. 
Yet another obstacle to the assertion of jurisdiction over vehicle 
manufacturers’ lawyers’ compliance counseling may be the TREAD Act, 
which seems to embody a distinctly different approach from that taken in 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  Sarbanes-Oxley clearly embraced lawyer-specific SEC 
regulations as an essential component of the regulatory regime.152  The 
TREAD Act includes no similar mandate.  Instead, Congress appears to 
have embraced an alternative approach, namely that automakers provide 
sufficiently comprehensive information to enable the NHTSA itself to 
identify vehicle defects and encourage, or if necessary order, automakers to 
recall defective vehicles.153 
Finally, any reporting out requirement may fundamentally restructure the 
lawyer-client relationship.  In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,154 the 
Court found a fundamental restructuring of the lawyer-client role 
unconstitutional even when the restrictions on Legal Services lawyers were 
related to government funding of legal services for private individuals.155  
While there may well be no First Amendment or other constitutional 
problem with a reporting out provision in the motor vehicle defect context, 
Velazquez may suggest caution nonetheless.  Where a restriction is imposed 
by the government not as a part of its control over its own expenditure but 
in its capacity as a regulator, a court could well demand that Congress 
clearly express its intent to allow the agency to regulate in such a way. 
In short, the NHTSA’s authority to regulate compliance lawyers’ advice 
on the necessity and timing of a recall is questionable, at least absent clearer 
legislative authorization. 
3.  Two Early 2000’s Abortive Agency 
Attempts to Regulate Lawyers 
Though agencies often maintain systems for exerting “institutional 
control” over lawyers participating in adjudications,156 two quite modest 
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2016] RECALLING THE LAWYERS 1917 
efforts to extend regulation of attorneys beyond the context of 
administrative adjudication in the early 2000’s both resulted in an agency 
retreat. 
In 2000, the CPSC sought to expand its jurisdiction over lawyers to cover 
attorney conduct outside of the context of formal adjudication.157  The 
CPSC explained that it conducts most of its business “outside of 
adjudicatory proceedings,” offering as examples negotiation with attorneys 
during an investigation or inquiry regarding a product or with respect to a 
voluntary corrective action plan for products or civil penalties.158  The 
proposed rule covered “regulatory matters or any other activities between 
attorneys . . . and a [CPSC] Commissioner or [CPSC] staff acting in their 
official capacities.”159  The CPSC made clear that an attorney need not 
engage in actual contact with a CPSC official for the rules’ prohibitions to 
apply.160  The CPSC ultimately terminated its rulemaking.161 
The NHTSA does not seem to have expanded its jurisdiction in the way 
the CPSC contemplated.162  Indeed, in implementing the TREAD Act, 
which requires vehicle manufacturers to report on vehicle safety claims, the 
NHTSA has carefully avoided intruding upon the province of outside 
counsel.  Reportable safety claims would include lawsuits.  However, the 
NHTSA excludes from its definition of field report, which must be 
provided to the NHTSA, any document “covered by the attorney-client 
privilege or the work product exclusion.”163  Moreover, it does not require 
vehicle manufacturers to obtain from their outside counsel information 
sufficient to identify a claim in litigation.  The manufacturer need merely 
“attempt to obtain the missing minimal specificity information” from 
outside counsel.164 
Agencies can seek to regulate clients’ obligations related to legal 
representation.  The proposed alternative to the noisy withdrawal rule, i.e., 
requiring a company to report a lawyer’s withdrawal, exemplifies such an 
approach.  The FCC’s revision of its rules for representations to the FCC 
also illustrates this potential approach. 
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Section 1.17 of the FCC’s regulations provided that “[n]o applicant, 
permittee or licensee shall in any response to [FCC] correspondence or 
inquiry or in any application, pleading, report or any other written statement 
submitted to the [FCC], make any misrepresentation or willful material 
omission bearing on any matter within the jurisdiction of the [FCC].”165  In 
February 2003, the FCC sought to expand the rule in four ways.166  First, 
the revision would prohibit even negligent misstatements or omissions.167  
Second, it would more clearly encompass statements made to the FCC in all 
contexts,168 including unsolicited voluntary submissions and statements 
made during investigatory proceedings.169  Third, the revised rule would 
include oral statements.170  Fourth, the provision was to apply to “all 
persons making statements to the [FCC] (e.g., including non-
regulatees).”171 
The Federal Communications Bar Association argued that applying the 
rule to lawyers would “potentially interfere with the attorney-client 
relationship by giving the attorney an incentive to disregard the client’s 
wishes to protect the attorney,” inter alia.172  In response, the FCC 
refocused the regulations on actual or potential FCC licensees, revising it to 
exclude “non-regulatees,” such as attorneys communicating with the FCC.  
Attorney misrepresentations would be attributed to the licensee rather than 
the lawyer. 
B.  Should the NHTSA Regulate Lawyers? 
Even if the NHTSA can regulate counsel’s regulatory compliance advice, 
should it?  An agency like the NHTSA might consider several types of 
issues in deciding whether to do so.  In particular, an agency should assess 
and evaluate the potential rationales for regulating lawyers’ conduct, the 
aspects of the legal practice context that might impact the efficacy of any 
such regulatory efforts, and potential alternatives (including imposing 
obligations on regulated entities) less likely to intrude upon the attorney-
client relationship. 
1.  The Rationales for Regulating Compliance Lawyers 
An agency might regulate lawyers:  (1)  to ensure that those entitled to a 
government benefit receive it, particularly when beneficiaries may be 
 
 165. 47 C.F.R. § 1.17 (2000) (amended). 
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Statements to the Commission, 17 FCC Rcd. 3296, 3297 (Feb. 14, 2002) (notice of proposed 
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Statements to the Commission, 18 FCC Rcd. 4016, para. 13 (Mar. 4, 2003) (final rule). 
 170. 17 FCC Rcd. at 3297. 
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 172. 18 FCC Rcd. 4016, para. 15. 
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unsophisticated; (2)  to protect the integrity of its own processes; and (3)  to 
help restrain regulated entities. 
Under the first rationale, the regulation of lawyers—often to ensure 
competence—furthers the interests of the government programs’ 
beneficiaries.  Thus, regulating tax preparers could, in part, ensure that 
taxpayers, particularly unsophisticated ones, receive the benefits they 
deserve while not being victimized by those providing assistance.  Perhaps 
regulation of patent lawyers could be justified on similar grounds.  This first 
rationale has little relevance to the regulation of motor vehicle 
manufacturers’ lawyers.  Sophisticated clients have ample ability to protect 
their own interests vis-à-vis their legal representatives.173 
The second rationale, protecting the integrity of the agency’s own 
processes, could justify the NHTSA’s jurisdiction over legal practice.  
Ensuring the veracity and accuracy of the information regulated entities 
submit as well as access to information about safety hazards goes to the 
heart of the integrity of the NHTSA’s processes.  In the Cobalt case, 
however, this rationale does not appear to be implicated; GM’s TREAD Act 
disclosures appear to be in substantial compliance with the Act’s 
requirements. 
Under the third rationale, an agency might employ the regulation of 
compliance attorneys as one tool to attain its regulatory goal of constraining 
regulated entities to protect those endangered by their actions.  The 
NHTSA, for example, might impose obligations on regulated entities’ 
lawyers to better protect the public from dangerous products.174  Lawyers’ 
advice, both with regard to initiating recalls or lesser remedial actions and 
compliance with reporting requirements, may have implications for the 
public’s safety.  Particularly given the NHTSA’s heavy reliance on motor 
vehicle manufacturers’ self-reporting as well as their initiation of voluntary 
recalls, public safety is particularly implicated in the Cobalt scandal.  The 
agency’s public safety goals are probably consistent with those of the 
regulated entity to the extent that the conduct required of the regulated 
entity is clear, a strong monitoring and enforcement system exists, and the 
magnitude of the penalties provide appropriate incentives.175  
Unfortunately, all three conditions rarely coexist. 
2.  The Legal Practice Context 
In deciding whether and how to regulate lawyers, agency officials must 
understand the role that lawyers play in the particular area of law, i.e., the 
legal practice context.  Such knowledge is critical to any assessment of the 
potential effectiveness of enlisting lawyers as gatekeepers.  An agency 
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contemplating such a course should consider at least the following five 
questions: 
(1) When are lawyers consulted and how heavily do company 
officials rely on their advice? 
(2) Are penalties for noncompliance reduced based on a “mistake of 
law” or a corporate official’s “good faith” reliance on an 
attorney’s advice? 
(3) Are actors legally prohibited from proceeding on a course of 
action without receiving formal concurrence from counsel?  If 
not, can the agency create a meaningful concurrence 
requirement? 
(4) To what degree do lawyers serve a “rule avoidance” function?  
That is, how often and to what extent do they structure or 
characterize actions in light of the applicable legal rules so as to 
obtain clients’ objectives while complying with the law? 
(5) To what extent can actors “shop around” for a lawyer who will 
provide the opinion the actor seeks? 
With respect to the first question, if the field is one in which actors 
frequently either do not consult or do no rely upon lawyers, imposing 
requirements on lawyers may do little good. 
With respect to the second question, while “ignorance of the law” is 
generally no excuse, in some contexts, “ignorance of the law” or reliance on 
“advice of counsel” may serve to mitigate, or perhaps even excuse, 
regulatory violations.176  For example, in the securities field, a reliance-on-
counsel “defense” might be available.177  The defense may apply only to 
violations that require scienter.178  To establish the defense, the defendant 
must establish that that he “(1)  made a complete disclosure to counsel; 
(2)  requested counsel’s advice as to the legality of the contemplated action; 
(3)  received advice that it was legal; and (4)  relied in good faith on that 
advice.”179  In some areas, the actor may be able to assert ignorance of the 
law even without consulting counsel.180 
Ignorance-of-the-law defenses, particularly if they require seeking advice 
of counsel, would increase the need to regulate lawyers’ provision of 
advice.  By providing legal advice, the lawyer would give the regulated 
entity sufficient comfort to pursue a course that it might otherwise be 
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disinclined to take (or, indeed, might be willing to take only on the basis of 
supportive legal advice).  Thus, addressing the lawyer’s conduct may 
significantly diminish the number of regulatory violations, depending on 
how clearly the law reflects regulators’ view of actors’ compliance 
obligations.  It is unclear whether advice of counsel would serve to mitigate 
a civil penalty under the Motor Safety Act, which does not appear to have a 
scienter requirement. 
The third question focuses on the existence, or potential to create, “gates” 
for lawyers to keep.  In some circumstances lawyers are natural gatekeepers 
due to the nature of the process in which the client is involved.181  Lawyers 
can interdict unlawful conduct where the conduct cannot proceed without 
their explicit approval.  Accountants and lawyers may be natural 
gatekeepers for certain securities transactions that cannot be closed without 
formal audits or opinion letters.182  In other circumstances, the agency 
perhaps can structure the processes regulated entities must pursue, so that 
lawyers can act as gatekeepers.183 
The fourth question focuses on the degree to which lawyers serve a rule-
avoidance role.  In some areas, lawyers frequently structure transactions to 
conform to legal requirements while providing many of the benefits the law 
sought to withhold.184  Lawyers often seem to function in this way in legal 
fields involving financial transactions, such as in tax law or securities law.  
The structuring and characterization of transactions can be critical in these 
areas.  But lawyers may play such a role less regularly in other areas, 
particularly those not governed by highly structured rules.  Flexible 
standards do not lend themselves to avoidance strategies.185  Rule 
avoidance may not be central to motor vehicle compliance lawyers’ work.  
Though the NHTSA has promulgated some motor vehicle safety standards, 
few rules constrain motor vehicle design; rather the presence of a defect 
turns on the application of a broad calculus-of-risk standard.  The greater 
the lawyers’ rule avoidance role, the more critical it is to regulate lawyers 
practicing in that area. 
The fifth question requires the agency to assess the regulated entity’s 
opportunity to “shop around” for a lawyer.  Imposing gatekeeping 
responsibilities on lawyers will be less successful if the regulated entity can 
“shop around” for lawyers who will “bless” a desired course of action.186  
One can envision a company changing outside counsel due to counsel’s 
unwillingness to affirm the legality of its desired actions.  Corporate 
officials may face a bit more difficulty in seeking to “shop around” for 
malleable in-house counsel, given the disruption caused by terminating a 
permanent employee and training a new one.  Of course, reporting up 
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within the legal department, or even a system of hierarchical control and 
clear areas of responsibility, would help diminish the ability of lower-level 
officials to shop around for a member of the legal department willing to 
affirm the legality of a desired course of action. 
3.  Possible Approaches 
The NHTSA might consider:  (1)  imposing reporting up or reporting out 
requirements, or (2)  imposing a requirement that regulated entities obtain 
formal concurrences from lawyers before making certain decisions. 
Reporting up obligations assist lawyers’ clients, but not necessarily 
regulatory beneficiaries.  Reporting up obligations directly serve two related 
functions.  First, they establish a supplemental monitoring system that 
provides high-level executive officers and the board with information and 
leverage they can use to rein in wayward subordinates inclined to perpetrate 
crimes or frauds.187  Secondly, reporting up obligations help align power 
with responsibility, ensuring that those who have the power to control 
corporate conduct cannot shirk their responsibilities by denying knowledge 
of potentially unlawful conduct.188  Thus, the requirement largely serves to 
protect the interests of corporate constituents (i.e., the management, board, 
and shareholders) and facilitate corporate governance. 
Indirectly, reporting up may lead to greater compliance.  The more 
widespread the knowledge of a potential unlawful course of action, the less 
likely that course of action will be pursued, particularly over lawyers’ 
objections.  Moreover, executive officers and board members may bring a 
broader perspective to the issue than the lower-level official contemplating 
the unlawful action.  Such executive officers and board members are better 
positioned to ensure that effective action is taken to address the breach. 
But reporting up obligations will surely leave many compliance problems 
unresolved.  Reporting up does not ensure that the General Counsel’s, the 
high-level executive officers’, and board’s view of the applicable regulatory 
requirements is congruent with the agency’s.  Indeed, the more ambiguous 
or indeterminate the legal requirements, the more likely such a divergence 
will emerge.189  For example, it is not clear that reporting up would have 
lead GM’s leadership to reject the view, common among the GM lawyers 
and engineers, that a recall should await determination of a root cause.  
 
 187. Indeed, In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. 
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the prosecutor’s findings that the corporation was criminally liable. Statement of Facts, 
supra note 93, ¶ 115 (“This [culpable] knowledge extended well above the ranks of 
investigating engineers to certain supervisors and attorneys at the Company—including 
GM’s Safety Director and the GM Safety Attorney.”). 
 189. And, of course, deficiencies in agency monitoring or inadequate penalties may mean 
that reporting up does not successfully prevent unlawful corporate actions. 
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Similarly, reporting up may well not have changed GM’s determination that 
moving stalls were unrelated to safety.190 
The NHTSA may lack the expertise to impose meaningful professional 
standards for in-house counsel regarding corporate regulatory compliance 
with the Highway Safety Act.  The appropriate actions are surely highly 
dependent on the structure and culture of the particular corporation and may 
not easily be amenable to fixed or determinate rules. 
Unlike reporting up, reporting out enhances the agency’s monitoring 
capabilities.  Agencies could defend imposition of such an obligation on in-
house compliance lawyers as consistent with Model Rule 1.6, though Rule 
1.6 generally reflects the view that reporting out is a matter of conscience, 
not legal obligation.191  Proposing a reporting out obligation would embroil 
the NHTSA in vigorous, long-standing arguments within the legal 
community regarding lawyers’ duties of loyalty and confidentiality.  
Viewing regulated entities’ lawyers as potential agency-monitoring 
resources that can assist agency efforts to protect regulatory beneficiaries 
arguably implicitly conceives of such lawyers as “agents” of the 
administrative agency, at least in part.  Such a conception seems somewhat 
inconsistent with the traditional client-focused view of the lawyer’s role, in 
which the lawyer primarily seeks to enable clients to protect their interests 
and attain their goals, advising them on how to do so within the bounds of 
the law (or that they cannot do so consistent with the law).192  Under such a 
view, lawyers do not serve to augment regulators’ enforcement resources.  
As noted earlier, the implicit conception of lawyers as supplemental 
resources for agencies could easily be viewed as fundamentally altering the 
attorney-client relationship, much as the restraints on Legal Services 
Corporation lawyers were viewed as altering the attorney-client relationship 
in Vasquez. 
In addition, legal scholars and lawyers have long debated whether 
requiring attorney disclosure of corporate client’s regulatory transgressions 
will discourage those clients from confiding in lawyers.  The SEC’s “noisy 
withdrawal” proposals produced broad opposition in the legal community, 
in part based on an argument that clients would be less willing to confide in 
lawyers.193  Several scholars in legal ethics have argued to the contrary.194  
An agency would be hard-pressed to rely on its “expertise” in defending its 
resolution of such issues. 
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In any event, alternative means of increasing monitoring resources may 
be equally effective and avoid requiring legal professionals to act in tension 
with the core professional value of protecting client confidences.  Congress 
could increase incentives for whistleblowers.  Though Congress has already 
provided job protection for whistleblowers revealing motor vehicle safety 
defects,195 Congress could, as some have proposed, offer bounties to 
potential whistleblowers.196  Such whistleblowers would not be bound by 
confidentiality obligations akin to those that constrain lawyers.  Thus, 
whistleblowers would report out in lieu of the lawyer being obligated to 
breach confidentiality by reporting out. 
The NHTSA could establish requirements for attorney certification, to 
ensure that corporate officials must consult with and obtain approval from 
lawyers before taking action.197  The Valukas report does not clearly 
describe GM’s in-house lawyers’ role with respect to some key decisions, 
such as the decision to classify the ignition switch problem as a customer 
convenience issue and the decision use a TSB drafted in innocuous 
language.  The nonlawyers’ conclusion that the ignition switch did not 
present a safety issue delayed GM’s response for years.  The decision to 
issue a TSB that downplayed the defect led to the failure to inform 
consumers of the initial “fix” GM had adopted.  Each of these decisions had 
legal ramifications and could have benefited from lawyers’ expertise.  The 
question of whether the ignition defect is “safety related” is a legal question 
that GM’s regulatory lawyers were grappling with on a broader level.  
Questions about the content, design, and delivery of a product warning 
frequently arise in products liability “warning defect” cases, where often the 
key question is the adequacy of a product warning.198  The decisions made 
regarding the initial characterization of the ignition switch defect and the 
handling of the TSB may well have been different had there been greater 
lawyer involvement.  Imposing a legal certification requirement would 
ensure in-house counsel’s involvement in such decisions.  Such a 
requirement would, for example, require decision makers to secure a 
certification from counsel that a defect is not safety related or that a 
decision to use a TSB in lieu of a recall and the TSB’s design and content 
are reasonable in light of the danger presented.  Not only would such a 
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certification requirement assure legal counsel’s involvement, it would also 
make counsel accountable for such decisions.199 
However, a certification requirement would compel the agency to 
confront potential incongruities between compliance lawyers’ and the 
agency’s views of the applicable legal constraints.  Agencies should expect 
lawyers’ advice to diverge from the advice agencies would find optimal.  
While compliance lawyers might take a broad pro-consumer approach to 
the question of what constitutes a safety defect, the NHTSA should not 
expect them to do so as a matter of professional obligation.200 
Any of the above regulatory approaches—mandatory reporting up, 
mandatory reporting out, and establishing a certification regime—would 
require the agency to create a disciplinary system.  Establishing a 
disciplinary system is particularly critical if the agency adopts a 
certification regime, so that the agency could punish lawyers who 
unreasonably provided certifications.  A disciplinary system would 
presumably prove costly201 and might divert the agency’s focus from the 
condition and operation of motor vehicles or the responsibility of the 
corporation to questions about the conduct of the company’s lawyers. 
4.  Restraining Regulated Entities, Not Lawyers 
Rather than regulating lawyers, Congress or the NHTSA might add 
precision to the obligations of motor vehicle and component parts 
manufacturers.  First, the NHTSA or Congress could address the dilemma 
facing manufacturers when they conclude a defect exists but cannot 
immediately determine its root cause.  Second, the NHTSA could provide 
much clearer guidance for determining when a defect is “related to safety.” 
The Cobalt airbag failures provide an example of a safety-related defect 
whose cause GM could not immediately ascertain.  GM’s in-house lawyers 
appeared to accept the proposition that a recall could not be initiated until 
GM could remedy the defect.  Much of the delay in responding to the 
ignition switch defect was due to the perceived need to await the engineers’ 
identification of the problem’s root cause.  However, such an approach 
ignores the Highway Safety Act’s requirement that the company must offer 
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a refund if it cannot remedy a safety-related defect.  Certainly immediately 
announcing the safety defect without a means to remedy it would be a 
substantial financial burden on the manufacturer, but the Highway Safety 
Act does not appear to allow manufacturers to delay the defect notification 
process on such a basis. 
However, even from the consumer perspective, there are reasons 
manufacturers should not act with undue haste.  Acting without 
understanding the root cause of a performance anomaly might mean that the 
remedy provided will prove deficient.  This could give consumers a false 
sense of security and require a second recall.202  In the Cobalt case, it might 
have resulted in a recall of insufficient or excessive scope.  An early recall 
might have been too broad because it might have been conducted before 
GM realized that later-model Cobalts contained a modified ignition switch.  
As it was, the initial recall was too limited; GM twice had to expand its 
scope.203  Moreover, a recall before the manufacturer has parts available to 
remedy the problem can frustrate car owners.204 
Notifying individuals of a recall without offering a remedy or a refund 
could allow customers to minimize their risk.  But when the malfunction is 
a mysterious “sensing anomaly” preventing airbag deployment, how can the 
car owner lessen the risk?  Most consumers might simply have to cope with 
a heightened concern about a safety risk they cannot diminish.  Perhaps 
acknowledging the manufacturers’ dilemma and allowing them a specified 
period to devise a remedy might produce more expeditious action than the 
current approach. 
The test for determining whether a defect is safety related, namely 
whether the defect poses “an unreasonable risk of accidents or injuries,”205 
is indeterminate and undeveloped.  In making the relevant determination, 
three factors must be weighed:  “(1)  the severity of the harm it threatens; 
(2)  the frequency with which that harm occurs in the threatened population 
relative to its incidence in the general population; and (3)  the economic, 
social, and safety consequences of reducing the risk to a so-called 
‘reasonable’ level.”206  Even with respect to moving stalls, which would 
appear to be an obvious safety problem, the NHTSA’s approach turns on 
[t]he rate at which stalling occurs . . ., the speeds at which stalling occurs, 
the type of operation during which stalling occurs (e.g., when starting, 
accelerating, decelerating, or cruising), [how quickly] the vehicle can [] 
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be restarted, . . . whether the stalling affects steering [or braking] 
functions, . . . and any crashes or other unsafe events.207 
Moreover, due to the prevalence of voluntary recalls, the governing case 
law is dated—the latest major case was decided in 1988.  Thus, 
manufacturers enjoy a great deal of discretion in determining which defects 
are “related to safety.” 
CONCLUSION 
The Highway Safety Act makes identifying and remedying defects highly 
dependent upon manufacturers’ and components parts makers’ own 
initiative.  The NHTSA lacks, and is unlikely to receive in the near future, 
sufficient enforcement resources to comprehensively perform such a task.  
It is natural to look to the automakers’ lawyers to secure manufacturers’ 
compliance with their Highway Safety Act obligations.  While safety 
should not be solely their responsibility, lawyers can surely be expected to 
be the primary proponents of regulatory compliance.  It is thus sensible to 
explore whether the NHTSA can impose compliance obligations on the 
auto industry’s lawyers.  Ultimately, however, such an approach would 
expand the NHTSA’s jurisdiction in a controversial way that Congress does 
not appear to have contemplated.  And neither the NHTSA nor Congress 
has exhausted the other options for ensuring that the voluntary recall system 
properly protects the public from motor vehicle defects. 
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